Not Everyone Has a Europe: The Unequal Choices Facing Middle Powers

This briefing examines how Canada's pursuit of closer ties with the European Union reveals the unequal opportunities available to middle powers seeking to reduce their dependence on major powers. It also explores how South Africa, Brazil and Indonesia must pursue alternative strategies through regional institutions and issue-specific coalitions, arguing that their capacity for strategic autonomy depends on existing institutional relationships, resources and bargaining power. This article was written by Silvie Drahosova and edited by Charlotte Jolivet.

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A North American country seeking an unprecedented association with the EU raises a broader question about how middle powers respond when dependence on a major power becomes a source of vulnerability. Canada’s path towards EU association illustrates an important inequality among middle powers: their ability to diversify depends not only on diplomatic ambition, but also on the institutions, resources, and regional relationships previously available to them. Middle powers without access to a comparable partner must rely more heavily on regional anchoring and issue-specific coalitions.

Amid a series of American threats to Canadian sovereignty, Canada is seeking to deepen its ties with the EU. The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, has proposed that Canada could become the EU’s first ‘associate member’—in Prime Minister Mark Carney’s words: a unique alliance rather than a conventional EU membership. Since this category does not exist in EU law, the forthcoming EU–Canada summit may indicate whether the proposal will develop into a concrete institutional framework.

EU–Canada cooperation is not starting from zero. The EU is Canada’s second-largest trading partner,  underpinned by the EU–Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). Since 2017, the EU–Canada Strategic Partnership Agreement has expanded cooperation, particularly in trade and investment, while the EU–Canada Security and Defence Partnership supports security cooperation. Canada has also become the first non-European country to participate in procurement under Security Action for Europe (SAFE), demonstrating that differentiated integration is already developing. Overall, EU–Canada cooperation in a wide range of areas, including Ukraine, hybrid threats, military mobility, and defence production provides a solid foundation for potential expansion into AI, energy, critical minerals, payments, research, and mobility.

Given Canada’s current geopolitical position and extensive relationships with the EU, the US and other partners (including Mexico, Australia and Chile), why is it now seeking to expand its international cooperation? As noted in Carney’s speech at Davos, Canada believes the rules-based order is crumbling – it no longer provides the security and benefits it once promised. In Carney’s diagnosis, the current international order is deteriorating because international law and trade rules are applied unequally: major powers are increasingly using economic integration as an instrument of political pressure. Because the US is Canada’s largest trading partner, this asymmetric interdependence is highly visible. The US makes use of its hegemonic status and uses tariffs, supply chains, financial infrastructure, and technology as instruments of pressure on its trading partners. Historically, Canada has accommodated this asymmetric relationship. However, as economic pressure has intensified under the second Trump administration, Canada has placed a stronger emphasis on strategic autonomy and diversified partnerships. Therefore, Carney argues for variable geometry, in which states should form different coalitions for different issues rather than construct one universal alliance. For middle powers like Canada, this strategy protects their domestic interests and reduces the vulnerabilities created by asymmetric interdependence.

Yet, when Carney refers to Canada as a middle power, what exactly does he mean? There is no universally accepted definition of a middle power. Nevertheless, middle powers can be identified by their more limited material capabilities in comparison to great powers, combined with meaningful regional influence and a tendency to pursue their interests through coalition-building, multilateral diplomacy, mediation, and specialised forms of ‘niche diplomacy.’ Further, middle powers are often aligned with one great power, making concentrated dependence on other more powerful states a source of vulnerability. Consequently, their governments seek to diversify their trade, security partnerships, and institutional ties to reduce this dependence. The institutions available to a middle power determine the form this diversification takes. Hence, there are differences in the bargaining power of middle powers. Western middle powers such as Canada and Australia are deeply embedded in well-established and comparatively well-resourced institutions within the existing international order. Emerging or Global South middle powers, such as Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia, also possess institutional options; however, they offer different arrangements and are often limited. Indeed, not all middle powers have the option of pursuing strategic cooperation with a like-minded organisation, as Canada does.

Canada’s pathway is a difficult one to reproduce due to its established position in the international order with its NATO and G7 memberships. As Canada already engages in extensive EU trade and security relations, it is easier to deepen this cooperation further. Canada’s regulatory and political institutions are also compatible with those of the EU, which might otherwise have posed an obstacle to this form of strategic middle-power cooperation. Additionally, Canada possesses resources desired by the EU, such as critical minerals and energy resources, as well as significant technological and financial capacity. The EU therefore offers Canada an additional institutional centre through which it can diversify without completely abandoning its existing alliances. Nevertheless, this is not without trade-offs. If Canada entered parts of the Single Market without decision-making rights, it might become a partial rule-taker and thus not be fully sovereign in its EU market-related decisions.

What options, then, are available to Global South or emerging middle powers? Their choices differ according to the strength of the regional institutions available to them, the strategic resources they can mobilise, and their capacity to build coalitions across regions. The contrasting positions of South Africa, Brazil, Indonesia, and Canada demonstrate why middle powers cannot follow a single model of diversification, but a specific diversification model tailored to their options.

South Africa’s principal advantage is its diplomatic legitimacy and position within regional and multilateral organisations. It operates through the AU, SADC, BRICS and the G20, while also exercising significant continental influence. It can therefore be seen as a continental pivot. However, South Africa faces domestic economic and capacity constraints that prevent it from automatically converting its numerous institutional memberships into material leverage. Unlike Canada, it cannot rely on extensive financial resources or privileged access to another powerful institutional centre. South Africa’s most viable strategy is therefore a combination of stronger regional anchoring and issue-specific coalition-building.

Brazil’s position is different. Its economic and diplomatic reach enables it to operate as a global player through Mercosur, BRICS and the G20, as well as through bilateral partnerships. However, it is managing significant economic dependence on China while preserving access to Western markets and investment. Consequently, Brazil uses multiple institutional memberships to avoid exclusive alignment with either China or the US and its allies. In this view, Brazil’s strategy combines regional anchoring with cross-regional coalition-building. 

Lastly, Indonesia’s leverage rests on its strategic resources, its importance within global supply chains, and its institutional position in ASEAN. Historically, Indonesia has maintained an independent and non-aligned foreign policy with flexible diplomatic engagement, making it unlikely to join an organisation that would significantly restrict its bilateral options. Indonesia is therefore most likely to pursue regional anchoring through ASEAN while participating selectively in issue-specific coalitions concerning critical minerals, trade, and maritime security.

These examples show that middle powers begin from various positions. South Africa derives influence from diplomatic legitimacy and regional institutions, Brazil from global reach and multiple institutional memberships, and Indonesia from strategic resources and ASEAN. Yet ASEAN is not equivalent to the EU–Canada relationship. While ASEAN is pursuing economic integration and a single market, it lacks the EU’s level of supranational regulatory authority, common institutions, or financial capacity. ASEAN therefore cannot offer Indonesia the same combination of external diversification, regulatory integration, and institutional resources that the EU could offer Canada. This shows that middle powers must combine regional anchoring and issue-specific coalitions according to their strengths and constraints.

These cases suggest that middle powers cannot follow a single model of diversification. Depending on their institutional access, regional position, and material capabilities, their strategies combine three mechanisms in different proportions:

1) Institutional association 

For Canada, institutional association would mean securing privileged access to selected EU programmes, markets, or decision-making structures without becoming a full member. Similar arrangements might eventually become available to certain highly compatible partners; nevertheless, this is not certain. A scenario could include the EU developing concentric circles of cooperation extending beyond geographical Europe, which would strengthen its global influence and expand its network of strategic partnerships. The possible limitations of this approach include regulatory alignment without voting rights, opposition from EU member states, legal uncertainty and concerns among EU candidate countries about privileged treatment for Canada, as well as limited applicability to states whose political and economic systems are less compatible with the EU.

Canada can pursue the path of institutional association because of its dependence on the US and its existing compatibility with the EU. Nevertheless, this pathway is very unlikely to become a general solution for Global South middle powers.

2) Stronger regional anchoring 

Regional associations can increase middle powers’ collective bargaining capacity. This could involve deeper anchoring in ASEAN for Indonesia, Mercosur for Brazil, and the AU, AfCFTA, and SADC for South Africa. Benefits include larger negotiating markets, common standards, regional supply chains, coordinated diplomatic positions, and a reduced ability for great powers to negotiate separately with weaker states. Nevertheless, political divisions among members, overlapping memberships, uneven state capacity, weak implementation mechanisms, and rivalry over regional leadership might obstruct collective decision-making and weaken implementation. Additionally, regional organisations can replace dependence on one major power with dependence on one regional bloc. Therefore, regional organisations are indispensable but cannot alone provide the economic and security protection the EU may offer Canada.

3) Issue-specific coalitions

Issue-specific coalitions are where Carney’s variable geometry develops most concretely. Coalitions could concern critical-mineral processing and producer coordination, climate finance, sovereign-debt restructuring, food and energy security, AI governance, WTO reform, UN representation, and maritime security. They would give middle powers a stronger standing in international negotiations, standard-setting bodies, and multilateral institutions. Additionally, they could potentially generate material benefits in the form of investment, technology transfers, supply-chain cooperation, market access, or more favourable international rules. However, the participating states in the coalitions may have different economic interests, strategic alignments, and relationships with great powers. Consequently, the coalitions would be difficult to sustain beyond the specific issue around which they were formed.

There is no single pathway for middle-power action that will replace the current international order. A development could be a layered system in which middle powers remain connected to major powers but deepen regional institutions, diversify strategic dependencies, participate in overlapping coalitions, and cooperate where their interests converge while disagreeing elsewhere. Canada may be able to look towards Europe because decades of economic, political, and security integration have made that option possible. Other middle powers are unlikely to find an equivalent institutional destination. Canada may have Europe, but other middle powers will have to construct their own alternatives. Their influence will depend on whether they can transform regional leadership, strategic resources, and issue-specific coalitions into durable collective bargaining power.