What To Expect: Is ‘El Niño’ an Inevitable Disaster?

This briefing examines the developing 2026–27 El Niño and its potential global consequences, exploring the risks of extreme weather in Southeast Asia and a worsening hunger crisis in Africa. It also analyses how declining international aid, geopolitical tensions and restrictions on food and fertiliser exports could shape the humanitarian response and determine the severity of the crisis. This article was written by Charlie Mylechreest and edited by Tanvi Sureka.

---

Introduction

Governments and media organisations have begun to sound the alarm over the developing ‘Super El Niño’, which, according to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), will peak in December, with Pacific sea-surface temperatures reaching up to 3.7°C above usual levels. This would place the current event among the most significant since 1950, well above the 2.0°C peak in the 2023–24 cycle.

Despite its meteorological significance, the strength of the current El Niño event does not necessarily imply disaster. Rather, its consequences depend on the interplay between weather events and international responses. The ‘very strong’ 2015–16 event left around 40 million people food insecure in southern Africa, compared to the weaker 2023–24 event, which left 61 million people in the same region in need of aid assistance.

In view of this, the scale of the current crisis remains uncertain. However, its potential outcomes can be assessed by observing two key indicators: how and where rains fall in the coming months, and whether governments will respond sufficiently. By understanding where climate effects are felt in the Pacific and what shapes hunger risk in Africa, we can better anticipate how potential humanitarian crises may unfold.

The 2026 El Niño

Numerous news sources and international organisations have explained at length the origins and consequences of the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO). Put simply, a period of warmer ocean temperatures occurs over the Eastern Pacific every two to seven years, which drives climate patterns such as rainfall and drought conditions.

The effects of the cycle move westward along with the temperature itself; the current El Niño has already affected Central American states in both agriculture (with drought conditions in Honduras and El Salvador) and economically (with falling water levels cutting Panama Canal shipping). The World Food Programme (WFP) expects Central America to see the largest relative rise in food insecurity of any region.

In line with this, several governments (particularly those in Southeast Asia) have diverted attention towards their food security. The Philippines has activated national plans under its ‘Task Force El Niño’, which has included billions of pesos in spending increases (though still predicts all provinces to be in drought conditions by March 2027). Meanwhile, Chinese state media insists that grain stocks sit ‘significantly above’ the internationally recommended 17 to 18 per cent benchmark. These governments, however, have greater capacity for preparation given their existing stockpiles and earlier wet season crop-planting (which they are already harvesting). As will be later discussed, the region with the greatest potential for famine is that of Southern Africa, which has been the focus of UN donation drives.

Climate exposure in the Pacific and Southeast Asia

Rather than famine, Southeast Asian states find the greatest risk in exposure to adverse weather events. Tropical cyclones, though likely to be less frequent over the season, have more potential to develop typhoon or super typhoon strength, according to the Philippine weather service.

On the other hand, the increased temperature brings a greater risk of drought, which has already caused significant fires in Indonesia. A delayed rainy season is expected across 60 per cent of the country, which has prolonged the current fire season and may lead to up to US$6.9 billion in damage. Far from being constrained to economic issues, the fires also present a serious domestic and international political challenge to the Indonesian government. Environmental protests have erupted in South Sumatra and Jambi, while Malaysia and Singapore (affected by the haze) have criticised Indonesia’s response. Offers of aid were initially ignored by Indonesia, though the government has now indicated it is willing to accept support from these countries. The fires, coupled with President Prabowo’s intransigent response, threaten to add further pressure to Indonesia’s growing instability in recent years.

A looming hunger crisis in Africa?

Like elsewhere, the ENSO has the dual effect of widespread drought in the south and increased flooding around the Horn of Africa. In this southern region, crops are usually grown from October to March (during the ENSO peak), but the resulting hunger occurs during the ‘lean season’ before the next harvest, which will occur in late 2027, according to the WFP. Despite this risk, the affected countries are still recovering from the 2023–24 El Niño, and many now enter the present cycle with their emergency supplies already eroded as a result.

In Somalia, heavy flooding forecasted for the October to December season could affect up to 3.4 million people, increasing displacement and therefore exacerbating the risk of famine. Funding shortfalls, however, have left the WFP expecting that it may only be able to support 10 per cent of those in acute food insecurity, let alone in the population as a whole.

To understand the potential scale of the hunger crisis, observers may note key indicators in the coming months. In southern Africa, delayed planting rains in November and December increase vulnerability, alongside dry spells in January and February (particularly affecting maize). River levels have already increased to dangerous levels in Somalia, and will continue to rise into November.

Will the international community respond?

As with any disaster, such damaging weather outcomes can generally be responded to with sufficient preparation, but only if the international community is willing. The international response to the 2024 event was already weak, with only a fifth of the WFP’s US$400 million funding appeal met. Similarly, calls by the WFP, UNICEF and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) for donations this year have been met with limited response – a call for even fewer donations (US$200 million by the FAO) was still unreached.

Compared to the previous cycle, the state of international aid funding is far worse heading into this crisis, driven above all by the closure of USAID in 2025. International humanitarian assistance fell from US$47.4 billion in 2023 to US$33.3 billion in 2025, with the majority of this fall occurring in 2025 alone. Though previously a contributor to almost half of total global aid, the US cut its contribution by 55 per cent, while aid from Germany fell by 36 per cent during a drive to divert funding towards defence and security. This trend has been observed across Europe and the OECD, prompting criticism. Despite the calls for response to the crisis, there are few signs that aid budgets will be restored in the near future.

Could non-OECD member state funded aid finally see greater recognition? Gulf states have partly filled the gap, with their share of public humanitarian funding rising from 10 to 17 per cent by 2025, though most of this is a relative increase as overall aid spending decreased. Aid is also often tied to geopolitical interest, most notably the US$784 million the UAE has given Sudan since 2023, though aid spending in the Gulf must be observed carefully as the Iran War and escalating crisis in Yemen have the potential to draw further costs. China also claimed a key role in recovery efforts after the previous El Niño cycle, supplying 10,000 tonnes of rice and wheat for Zimbabwe. However, following restricted flows of petrochemicals through the Strait of Hormuz, China banned fertiliser exports for several months, disproportionately affecting sub-Saharan households. As China increasingly sees a reopening of the strait as essential to its own interests, it is likely that African states will also petition the country to put greater pressure on the US to achieve a deal, especially as planting seasons approach.

Domestic indicators may be more useful than international needs to understand how exporters will approach their international trading partners, exhibited by India during the previous crisis. Anticipation of a shortfall in rice production as the ENSO loomed and an 11.5 per cent year-on-year price increase led India to ban exports of non-basmati rice in 2023, with the greatest effects felt in Africa and the Middle East.

Such a ban has not yet been imposed in India during the current event; however, the risk remains as rice prices reach a 9.4 per cent increase on the previous year as of mid-October, following a weaker monsoon driven by the ENSO. No formal threshold for an export ban exists, though the approach to 2023 figures suggests such measures may be considered. Furthermore, upcoming state elections in early 2027 in Uttar Pradesh and Punjab may encourage the national government to restrict exports, lowering prices to ease voters.

There may yet be an option for affected states should India control exports again, as the 2023 ban enabled the Indian government to permit exports to partners in line with their ‘food security needs’, with millions of tonnes traded across Africa and Asia. As the potential for a ban appears again, these importing nations will likely spend significant diplomatic capital to improve relations, providing leverage to India at present.

What comes next

In summary, the outcome of the 2026–27 El Niño event is not easily predictable, nor necessarily devastating, even if it is extremely strong. To understand whether the ‘worst-case’ humanitarian scenario could emerge, observers may pay close attention to developments over the coming months.

Increased river levels in Somalia in October and November would provide the basis for large-scale displacement and famine, while late rains in southern Africa at the end of this year and a dry period in January would likely precede an outright harvest failure in 2027. Expected drought declarations in the Philippines and other Southeast Asian states in early 2027 will influence the scale of rice import demands, coinciding with the potential for Indian exports to be squeezed in response to its domestic pressures. US electoral backlash in November to energy prices stemming from the Iran War may pressure a reopening of the Strait of Hormuz which would increase fertiliser availability, though the impact will be limited until the following harvest.

As with any disaster, a humanitarian crisis resulting from the 2026–27 El Niño event would arise when adverse conditions are met with inadequate mitigation and response by the international community. With wars, energy costs, political instability and populist issues dominating media headlines, the ability of a distant famine or climate devastation to grab the attention of governments and populations, however compassionate, is limited.