Neither Weak nor Neutral: Rethinking the 'ASEAN Way' as an Anti-Colonial Discursive Project

This briefing examines the ‘ASEAN Way’ as a deliberate anti-colonial discursive project, arguing that ASEAN's non-interference principles represent a rejection of conditioned sovereignty rather than institutional weakness. This article was written by Nicolas Valladolid and edited by Aranyika Kapur.

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Introduction

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is routinely dismissed as toothless. Its refusal to intervene in Myanmar, its preference for consensus over coercion, and its rejection of binding dispute resolution are read as signs of institutional weakness. This understanding depends on the assumption that sovereignty should be conditional and that order requires the threat of punishment. These assumptions are not neutral but embedded in colonial histories and reproduced through the institutional architecture of the international system. The "ASEAN Way" is better understood not as a failure to meet international standards, but rather a deliberate rejection of colonial conditions and hierarchies.

Sovereignty and Order as Colonial Inheritance

"Sovereignty" and "order" are rhetorically embedded in the structure and language of international organisations and institutions. Looking closely at Article 2 of the UN Charter, respect for the "sovereign equality" of all states features prominently, prohibiting intervention in others' domestic affairs and threats to territorial integrity. The idea of international "order", defined by Hedley Bull as the presence of international institutions, regimes, and norms which make international relations more predictable, is central to the UN system. Chapter VII of the Charter creates institutions, such as the UN Security Council (UNSC), to preserve international "order" through commitments to pacific dispute resolution and punitive mechanisms to address threats to international security.

Yet these conceptions of "sovereignty" and "order" are not neutral but embedded within colonial histories. Chapters XI and XII of the Charter condition sovereignty on the ability to self-govern, establishing "trusteeship" mechanisms for imperial nations to "supervise" colonial holdings during the transition towards "self-governance", excluding the language of "independence". Sovereignty then became a privilege for non-European states which had to be earned, recreating "standards of civilisation" logics. Colonial possessions had to demonstrate capacity for self-governance to be considered deserving of sovereignty.

Although post-colonial states pushed for universal paths towards independence through the 1960 UN Resolution 1514, "standard of civilisation" logics still shape which states are deemed fully "sovereign". Chapter VII allows the UNSC to organise interventions in states deemed threats to international security through sanctions or multilateral uses of force. Article 2 sovereign privileges, such as non-intervention in domestic affairs, are therefore conditioned on UNSC action, allowing powerful, predominantly Western, imperial states to determine the distribution of "sovereignty". Similarly, the rise of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in the early 2000s premised the privilege of non-intervention on the domestic protection of human rights. The application of R2P, while engaging with real threats to human rights globally, has also imposed adherence to liberal, democratic norms as a new "standard of civilisation".

These "standards" are directly tied to "order". Kofi Annan, as UN Secretary-General, justified the emergence of R2P as central to international order. International peace was contingent upon the protection of human rights; conflict prevention and human security justified the abrogation of sovereignty for offending states to maintain international order. The UNSC has also been tasked with upholding R2P, allowing for Chapter VII and VIII interventions in response to human rights violations. For the UN, the maintenance of international order has been tied to R2P principles, while monopolising the power to intervene in the hands of powerful nations within the UNSC. Thus, both the right to sovereignty and the determination of threats to international order depend on ingrained global hierarchies.

This framework of conditioned sovereignty has diffused across regional organisations, most of which have accepted R2P logics as overrides to non-interference principles. Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) establishes non-interference and territorial integrity as central to sovereign equality, yet the AU conditioned these on R2P norms through the 2005 Ezulwini Consensus. The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) followed a similar path, allowing for an abrogation of its non-interference principle under conditions of severe and urgent security risks under the 2000 Biketawa Declaration. Among major regional organisations, ASEAN stands as an outlier in its sustained resistance to this conditioning of sovereignty.

The "ASEAN Way"

In the context of the dominant view of sovereignty and order as conditioned on the protection of human rights and human security, ASEAN has taken a unique stance towards the maintenance of sovereignty and regional order. Established by the 1967 Bangkok Treaty with the goals of ensuring peace and prosperity in Southeast Asia, ASEAN has held "sovereignty", defined as non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states along with respect for territorial integrity and national identity, as crucial founding principles. The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and the Charter reaffirmed these principles while establishing pacific dispute resolution and rejection of force as crucial to international order. ASEAN's dispute resolution process has largely adhered to these principles, centring consultation and mediation, rather than intervention, as preferred procedures. This consultative mediation process, which rejects intervention, comprises the core of the "ASEAN Way".

The "ASEAN Way" has received considerable contestation, both internal and external to the organisation. In response to R2P, through the 2003 Bali Concord II and the 2009 ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint, ASEAN rhetorically recognised human rights and human security issues as central to regional order. However, efforts towards stronger human rights action and intervention mechanisms were quickly sidelined in favour of consultative processes, reflecting ASEAN members' apprehension towards a loosening of the non-intervention principle. Similarly, in response to the 2017 Rakhine Crisis in Myanmar, the international community, along with Malaysia, pushed ASEAN to intervene. ASEAN again resisted, citing preferences for engagement and consultation with Myanmar, fearing that overt pressure would undermine ASEAN norms and push Myanmar out of the organisation.

Sovereignty as Right

ASEAN's institutional language represents a distinct deviation from the dominant framework of conditioned sovereignty. In the UN system, a right-to-sovereignty logic features prominently through R2P and Chapter VII UNSC interventions: states acting against established international norms lose their right to sovereignty. ASEAN, by contrast, treats territorial integrity and non-intervention as non-negotiable elements of sovereignty, not privileges to be withdrawn.

The roots of this position are historical. ASEAN's establishment in 1967 occurred during a period of significant interstate tensions between the original five member states (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines). Singapore had split from the Federation of Malaya two years prior, with Singapore-Malaysia tensions recurrent throughout the separation process. Indonesia's low-intensity conflict, Konfrontasi, against Malaysia had just ended. Malaysia was engaged in territorial disputes with both Thailand and the Philippines over Thailand's two southern provinces and the Malaysian state of Sabah, respectively. As most ASEAN states, apart from Thailand, were newly independent, these states faced significant contestation to their rule through both territorial challenges from other states and internal separatist conflicts, such as the Moros in the southern Philippines and the Papuan and Acehnese separatist movements in Indonesia. The history of nationalist independence struggles, particularly in Malaysia and Indonesia, created apprehension towards external intervention, driving Indonesian initiatives towards a "great power-free" Southeast Asia.

In this context, ASEAN's conception of "sovereignty" came with stronger incentives behind non-interference and respect for territorial integrity. "Sovereignty" is treated as a right afforded to all ASEAN states, not dependent on adherence to certain norms of human rights. Non-intervention and respect for territorial integrity have reduced the avenues for conflict, as these norms bind ASEAN states from engaging directly in the controversies of other states. This is not incidental. The history of the region forced members to view external interference in a state's sovereignty as uniquely dangerous, driving the diffusion of norms which directly contest standard-of-civilisation logics. Whereas the UN system asks whether a state deserves sovereignty, ASEAN refuses the question. If states can be justified in intervening in the affairs of others, there is a higher chance of interstate conflict, undermining the core goals and values of ASEAN.

Order Through Relationships

In the UN system, the UNSC guarantees order through intervention, sanctions, and consultation, representing a relatively hierarchical, coercive, and punitive model of order maintenance. ASEAN, through the non-interference principle, operates through more consultative and relational means. As outlined by the TAC, ASEAN states commit themselves to the amicable resolution of disputes. ASEAN lacks formal dispute resolution mechanisms, instead relying on current ASEAN chairs and leaders to mediate between disputing parties. Chairs and other interested ASEAN leaders mobilise their personal networks to seek dialogue and agreement.

For example, during the 2008 Preah Vihear dispute between Thailand and Cambodia, there was no general ASEAN support for Cambodia's decision to escalate by bringing the dispute to the UNSC. To forestall this, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa convened a meeting with other ASEAN FMs to extend an offer to mediate. The chair at the time, Singaporean FM George Yeo, rejected this proposal, believing bilateral negotiations were sufficient, and mobilised support from other ASEAN FMs to block it. When Indonesia reassumed the chairmanship in 2011, Natalegawa was able to mobilise networks within both Thailand and Cambodia to seek a mediated agreement.

ASEAN leaders also cooperate through personal ties that sometimes operate beyond formal institutions. In 2018, Thai DPM Pravit Wongsuwan and Cambodian DM Tea Banh signed an agreement to extradite each other's political opposition to prevent transnational political contestation. In 2021, Burmese General Min Aung Hlaing signed a similar agreement with Thai General Prayuth Chan-o-cha to allow each to better control their own political opposition. Vietnam and Cambodia have had similar arrangements following the 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. These ties develop through strong interpersonal relations and repeated personal contact, such as Prayuth Chan-o-cha's closeness with Min Aung Hlaing or the Shinawatra family's longstanding friendship with the Cambodian Hun family. The relational infrastructure that enables ASEAN's consultative order also enables elite coordination that can work towards the maintenance of illiberal regional orders.

Conclusion

The future of ASEAN holds unique challenges to the norm of non-intervention. The recurrence of civil war in Myanmar and the Rakhine Crisis have placed increased pressure on ASEAN to intervene in the affairs of other member states. As US-China competition in Southeast Asia accelerates, regional order may become harder to maintain as new spheres of influence calcify.

The significance of the “ASEAN Way" extends beyond the question of whether it "works". Despite intermittent military action between Thailand and Cambodia, there has been an absence of large-scale war in a region that should be uniquely conflict-prone. The "ASEAN Way" shifts dispute resolution away from combative relations towards consultation and consensus, reducing the avenues for escalation. More fundamentally, it challenges the evaluative framework itself. The "ASEAN Way" is neither weak nor neutral. It is a counter-discourse which insists that sovereignty is a right rather than a privilege and that order can be built through relationships rather than hierarchies. Whether that counter-discourse can survive new pressures on Southeast Asia is an open question. However, dismissing it as institutional inertia misreads its origins, functioning, and intent.