Caught Between India and Pakistan: America’s Strategic Dilemma in South Asia

This briefing examines the contradictions at the heart of American strategy in South Asia, arguing that Washington’s simultaneous efforts to strengthen India as a counterweight to China and maintain close ties with Pakistan increasingly undermine one another. It also explores how India’s pursuit of strategic autonomy could limit its willingness to align with US interests, leaving Washington struggling to reconcile its competing regional priorities. This article was written by Jaeden Tee Jien Ren and edited by Tanvi Sureka.

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On 11 February 2026, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs S. Paul Kapur testified before the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee at a hearing titled, “South Asia: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Region”. An accomplished scholar and author of multiple books on South Asian grand strategy and international relations, Kapur brings considerable academic expertise to the second Trump Administration. 

And yet, the policy objectives discussed by Kapur at the hearing, which act as the guiding principles behind America’s South Asia strategy as a whole, bear the same hallmarks of contradictions and confusion that have haunted American foreign policy in South Asia for decades. 

Subsection 1: The Pillars of American Policy in South Asia

First, Kapur highlights the importance of a strong and independent India to American strategic interests, namely in containing China. As the world’s most populous nation, India serves as an important anchor for American power in the western half of the Indo-Pacific. Given the wider American objectives of containment, notably reflected in its Island Chain strategy in the Pacific, one can surmise that American objectives in South Asia follow a similar logic. India, hence, plays an important role in deterring Chinese expansion and preventing it from imposing coercive influence over the region. 

The second objective discussed by Kapur was the desire of the United States for a “free and open South Asia”, one in which no hegemonic power could dominate and exert coercive economic leverage over the region. American support for Pakistan can be understood as another key policy; as a key middle power in the region, Pakistan checks any attempt by a hostile hegemonic power to dominate South Asia, through the threat of its own military and nuclear capabilities. It further ensures the threat of nuclear terrorism originating from Islamabad is kept minimal, and that the US remains able to mediate any potential conflicts in the region as a neutral mediator.  

While Kapur’s statement goes beyond these two fundamental pillars, these primary goals are the objectives of any American policy decision in the region. However, as this article will argue, these goals are contradictory in nature, as the conditions needed for these policies to co-exist peacefully have weakened with the rise of China and the relative decline of American hegemony. Instead of furthering American objectives, the pursuit of these policies may in fact harm America’s strategic position, hence requiring a reconfiguration of American strategic policy in South Asia. 

Subsection 2: India’s Strategic Autonomy  

The first thing to consider is the conflict between these two otherwise rational goals. On paper, both objectives seem to go hand in hand. As a key player in the region, it seems natural that America would lean on India to act as a hedge against Chinese ambitions, while also helping to ensure that South Asia remains “free and open” to American economic trade.  

But this reading of America’s objectives fails to consider that China is not the only nation with the ability to project hegemonic power in South Asia. In fact, Kapur’s testimony to the subcommittee made no direct mention of Beijing in its discussion of a “free and open South Asia”, instead presenting this objective as a principle the United States should defend against any power. 

While not mentioned explicitly, this distinction is significant. India, as discussed in his testimony, also has the potential to become a key, and notably a potentially hegemonic, power in South Asia. And on paper, India appears willing to align with American interests, especially regarding China. This was the case after 2020, when the Galwan border clashes galvanised Indian policymakers and opened the door to greater cooperation with the United States on security matters. Hence, even if India could dominate South Asia, doing so could theoretically be in America’s interests. 

But what ultimately concerns American policymakers is India’s determination to pursue what S. Jaishankar, India’s Minister of External Affairs, terms the “India Way”; a foreign policy approach that emphasises India’s own strategic autonomy and independence from external influence, including that of the United States itself. Notably, despite the key concessions granted to India under the first Trump Administration and into the Biden Administration, such as the granting of  Strategic Trade Authorisation-1 (STA-1) status (which allows it to purchase dual-use military technology normally only reserved for NATO members), India has continued to maintain diplomatic distance from Washington and refused to align on key issues, such as sanctions against Russia following its invasion of Ukraine, which has infuriated Washington to the point of taking measures against India itself.  

As such, the stronger India becomes economically, militarily, or diplomatically, the greater its potential to emerge as a regional heavyweight capable of opposing American interests. This creates a possible tension with the second pillar of American South Asia strategy identified earlier: preventing any single power from dominating the region.  

US anxieties about India's strategic alignment and rise are exemplified in the statements of US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau. Landau, a noted “America First” ideologue in the Trump Administration, bluntly stated during the March 2026 Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi that Washington would not repeat the strategic “mistake” it made with China two decades ago by opening its markets, technology, and capital to foster an economic rival.  

The framing of American economic engagement with China, such as with America’s support of China’s accession to the WTO, as a “mistake”, and its comparison to India’s own economic engagement with the United States, is noteworthy. It suggests the extent to which Washington may be reluctant to “support” India’s rise without greater strategic alignment.  

His remarks were received critically in New Delhi. S. Jaishankar, without directly referencing Landau, stated that “no country can decide about India’s rise” shortly after the remarks were made.  

Subsection 3: The Importance of Pakistan  

Strategic alignment is not the only cause of tension in the American-Indian relationship. While America may worry about India’s strategic alignment, India, too, remains concerned about America’s relationship with the other major nuclear power in South Asia, Pakistan.  

As part of its broader engagement with South Asia, American leaders have long maintained a bilateral relationship with Pakistan. Having emerged from Partition in 1947 and confronted with what Pakistani leaders perceived as a larger, hostile neighbour in India, Pakistan has long understood the importance of relying on a powerful patron as a means of protection. From joining SEATO in the 1950s to establishing close security ties that bore fruit with Washington’s support for Islamabad during the 1971 Bangladesh War of Independence,  Pakistan and the United States have maintained significant strategic ties. In exchange for critical US economic and military aid to Pakistan, the United States gained a partner strategically placed to exert influence across the Middle East, Central Asia and, critically, South Asia. 

Of course, this relationship creates tension with New Delhi, especially given Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1998. This came with Washington’s tacit approval as American agencies monitored Islamabad’s nuclear progress without any intervention. America’s continued support for Pakistan, partly shaped by concerns over regional stability and nuclear security, remains a thorn in the side of New Delhi. India took note of the US$1 billion disbursement provided by the IMF (and approved by the Americans) to Pakistan, as part of its 24th IMF bailout to date, which occurred shortly after Indian planes struck the country during the 2025 conflict between the two. 

Even beyond the fact that America maintains ties with an openly hostile adversary of India, the existence of Pakistan also complicates India’s ability to fulfil the critical role of deterring China’s influence that America wants it to, as Indian resources must be divided between both sides of its frontier. In that sense, the contradictions of America’s South Asia policy are exposed. By supporting Pakistan to ensure a “free and open” South Asia, America may indirectly hamper its own ability to use the region as an anchor against China, as India grows increasingly frustrated with American support for its adversary and is unable to consolidate its resources against China, even if it wished to align more closely with Washington.  

Subsection 4: The Consequences 

The consequence of America’s continued pursuit of a disjointed policy is not necessarily an India overtly hostile to it and friendly to America’s chief adversary, China. After all, ever since the 1962 border clashes, both China and India have viewed each other with significant mistrust and suspicion, despite recent attempts to improve relations under Xi and Modi respectively. The limits of this “reset” can be seen right now, with border clashes straining this renewed push for a thaw.  

Instead, what the United States should fear if its current policies are pursued is an India that grows frustrated with America and thus indifferent to American interests. An India that actively chooses to maintain close ties with American adversaries like Russia, and one that declines to play a role in America’s attempts to contain China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific region.  

In the end, while post-Trump America may renew its attempts to curry favour with India in an effort to contain China, without addressing the structural differences between the two nations, every Quad summit will only further expose the ceiling of the American-Indian relationship.