“Anti-Neocolonial” Politics & Security: Trade and Resource Rules in Senegal

This briefing examines Senegal's moves to ending colonial-era arrangements. It looks at security sovereignty, taking back control in various sectors, monetary ambitions, and regional movements. This article was written by Naa Yarley Yartey, and edited by Frankie Finch.

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Introduction

Senegal under President Bassirou Diomaye Faye has quietly begun reclaiming sovereignty and ending colonial-era arrangements without severing critical ties. In the past year, Dakar has asked its long-time ally France to close military bases and launched audits of oil, gas and mining contracts, even as the country produced its first offshore oil and started exporting natural gas. These moves are communicated domestically as strengthening sovereignty. However, rather than a dramatic break, Senegal is carefully recalibrating partnerships. The strategy is to rewrite the terms of engagement from the inside by renegotiating security pacts, tweaking resource deals and pressing for regional currency reform, all while keeping Western aid and investment within reach.

By July 2025, France had officially handed over Camp Geille in Dakar, its last permanent military facility, at a ceremony raising the Senegalese flag and playing the national anthem. This marked the end of a 65-year French troop presence in Senegal. President Faye had declared foreign bases “incompatible with Senegalese sovereignty” and France agreed in advance to withdraw by late 2025. Paris is shifting from permanent deployments to new contracts for training, joint exercises and intelligence sharing.

Security Sovereignty

This security realignment echoes a wider Sahel upheaval. In neighbouring Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, coup regimes have kicked out French forces and invited Russian mercenaries. Russia’s Wagner Group officially withdrew from Mali in mid-2025, only to be replaced by a Kremlin-backed "Africa Corps" that remains on the ground. Senegal so far has not followed suit with Russian forces. However, the changing market of security partners gives Dakar bargaining power. Knowing that Mali’s junta now works with Russian trainers, Senegal can insist on clear, limited contracts and exit clauses with any foreign troop. In practice, Dakar is pricing sovereignty by demanding reforms in how outside help is delivered. It has no need to swap one foreign army for another, and foreign donors (France and others) still want a stable, pro-Western Senegal. This gives Senegal leverage at the negotiating table to ensure that any cooperation comes on its own terms.

Taking back control in other sectors

A similar calculation is unfolding in the oil and gas sector. Senegal only recently started pumping its first offshore oil (from Woodside Energy’s Sangomar field in mid-2024) and liquefied natural gas at a new plant. That nascent production gives Dakar a rare opportunity because it can adjust deals now that the money is flowing. Early in Faye’s tenure, the government appointed an expert commission to audit all oil, gas and mining contracts . Energy Minister Birame Souleye Diop announced that the audit would “publish the contracts” and look for ways “in the interests of the people” to improve terms, and that it would renegotiate any deals if needed. Crucially, the emphasis has been on targeted tweaks, not outright cancellation. Senegal’s new oil wealth makes it easier to demand a higher share of royalties or stronger local hiring clauses, so long as investors are not spooked. At the same time, most contracts contain “stabilisation” clauses that lock in terms, so any changes must be carefully calibrated. Faye’s approach is pragmatic; he can use the audit to identify technical points that can be adjusted in Senegal’s favour and negotiate changes with hard data in hand. If done transparently and narrowly, companies may accept the new terms as part of doing business. Though if the process drags on or seems unstable, foreign investors could sue or delay projects. The government’s task is to show that it is not asking for a fairer deal now that the wells are producing.

The fisheries sector offers another example of balancing sovereignty with pragmatism. Senegal’s coastal waters teem with fish that support millions of livelihoods, yet for years foreign trawlers have overfished Senegalese waters. In late 2024, the European Union announced it would not renew its fishing access agreement with Senegal. Under that deal, EU trawlers paid for licences but accounted for only a tiny fraction of the catch; critics said the fees brought little benefit to local communities. The EU cited Senegal’s failure to police illegal fishing and promised to leave by the expiration date, taking with it about €30 million a year.

Dakar is trying to turn this setback into a gain. Fisheries account for roughly one-sixth of Senegal's labour force, mostly in traditional wooden pirogues along the coast, so the president must show he can protect the sector. Faye immediately ordered an audit of the fisheries sector and the old EU agreement, aiming to rewrite the rules. In practice, the government is tightening licensing for large trawlers, increasing patrols, and insisting that any future foreign fishing come under transparent new contracts that truly benefit Senegal. Cancelling the EU deal means losing the license fees and risking higher fish prices in the short term, but it also opens Senegalese waters to its own boats and heightens enforcement against illegal catches. If Senegal succeeds in this rebalancing (more fish for local fishers and tougher terms for outsiders), then the non-renewal will be seen as a victory for sovereignty. If not, disaffected fishers will accuse the government of empty rhetoric.

Monetary Ambitions

Money and monetary policy are deeply symbolic for Faye’s coalition. Senegal remains in the West African Monetary Union (WAEMU), using the CFA franc pegged to the euro. In the 2024 campaign, both Faye and his ally Ousmane Sonko loudly backed a national currency. But after taking power, they shifted to a more cautious path. In a press conference, Sonko said the government would first push for monetary reform at the regional level and "if that fails", then consider a national currency. In practice, Faye’s team bet on deeper integration rather than abrupt exit. By 2025 that stance was vindicated. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) leaders agreed to revive the long-delayed plan for a single West African currency (the Eco) as early as 2027, launching it with any willing members rather than waiting for everyone to qualify. For Senegal, this meant it could demand stronger fiscal rules, tighter inflation control and modern payment systems at the WAEMU level (all steps toward sovereignty) while keeping the existing franc in circulation. In other words, Dakar is increasing its sovereignty by channeling its demand for monetary independence into regional reform. This avoids scaring investors or spiking inflation with a sudden currency change. Still, technocrats note that a new currency won’t solve the fundamentals. Senegal will need prudent budgets and sound banking policies in any case, whether the bills say “CFA” or “Eco.”

Regional Movements

All these moves are occurring against a turbulent regional backdrop. In January 2025, ECOWAS formally accepted the departure of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Those three coup-led states had formed the “Alliance of Sahel States” and even issued new biometric passports. Crucially, however, ECOWAS decided it would “keep its doors open” to remaining members, including Senegal, and agreed to continue recognising passports and ID cards from the breakaway countries and to let goods flow under the old ECOWAS rules. Senegal is a coastal exporter dependent on regional trade corridors, so this was vital. It means trucks can still carry Senegalese cement northward, and Malian electricity can still flow south into Dakar. Faye’s government has pointed out that these ties will remain even as Dakar pursues fairer deals. In effect, Senegal is defending regional public goods like tariff-free trade and passport-free travel while also pushing back on specific arrangements it deems unfair. For example, Senegal still buys hydroelectricity from Mali and ships produce through Niger’s railways. Maintaining those links under ECOWAS auspices gives stability. At the same time, the new Sahel bloc has other partners (notably Russia), so Senegal must navigate security cooperation carefully. If jihadist violence flares, the question will be whether Senegal’s new security agreements hold together or whether partners step in. If the Eco currency falters or global prices spike, Dakar will face tough choices too. In all these tests, Senegal’s approach is to work through institutions and evidence rather than flaunt sovereignty in speeches.

Conclusion

Overall, Senegal has taken a slower, inside the tent route to autonomy. It removed a colonial-era military base without derailing relations with France, it is auditing resource contracts instead of tearing them up wholesale, and it is seeking a new currency through region-wide reforms rather than a unilateral exit. The goal has been to make the state stronger in practice, not to score propaganda points.

The proof will be in concrete outcomes. Will a bigger share of oil and gas revenues fund hospitals? Will coastal communities see more fish instead of empty nets? Will prices remain stable if the CFA franc is eventually phased out? If months and years of audits, negotiations and stronger enforcement result in safer streets, reliable power and fuller fish markets, Senegal will have shown that sovereignty can grow quietly. It will have done so by rewriting the rules of engagement, not by shutting the door. By that measure, Senegal’s cautious path may make it more sovereign in reality than nations that chose abrupt rupture and found themselves more isolated.