From Geneva to Doha: Concert Diplomacy in the Modern Era

This briefing explores statecraft, using applied history methodology and historical case studies as comparisons to the role Middle Eastern powers are increasingly playing in hosting diplomatic processes. This article was written by Esha Toshniwal and edited by Frankie Finch.

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Introduction

Diplomacy is more than summits, discourse, and treaties; at its core, it is spatial. Negotiation demands venues that are not only politically acceptable to rival actors, but also capable of sustaining prolonged diplomatic engagement. Historically, successful diplomatic centres have often benefited from politically neutrality, internal stability, and being globally well-connected. This allows adversaries to meet without fear of coercion or symbolic disadvantage.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, cities such as Geneva, Vienna, Paris, and The Hague emerged as linchpins in international diplomacy. Geneva’s neutrality established it as an ideal location for housing prominent international organisations like the League of Nations, and later numerous United Nations agencies. Vienna hosted the Congress of Vienna, giving rise to great-power conference diplomacy. Meanwhile, Paris and The Hague served as sites for important peace conferences and the institutionalisation of international law, respectively.

However, these capitals no longer occupy uncontested positions in the diplomatic landscape, where perceptions of neutrality have eroded given the West’s increasing participation in contemporary conflicts, the polarisation of international institutions, and the general diffusion of global power. Consequently, Middle Eastern capitals such as Doha, Muscat, and Riyadh are adopting roles once associated with European capitals. Their classification as a new diplomatic “trinity” positions them as indispensable intermediaries in global affairs and reveal a broader structural shift towards the institutionalisation of a multipolar world order.

Case Studies

To explain how diplomacy becomes a tool of statecraft – the ways in which states manage international relations to their advantage – this article uses a comparative approach, drawing on both historical and contemporary examples. By comparing twentieth-century European diplomatic capitals with their twenty-first-century Middle Eastern parallels, the article demonstrates how European concert diplomacy remains relevant to modern diplomatic practices. Rather than equating contexts, this article demonstrates the evolution of diplomacy amidst periods of systemic transition.

Geneva and Doha

In the interwar years, Geneva exemplified the extent of influence a small state could wield in global diplomacy. Switzerland’s domestic stability and long-standing policy of non-alignment made Geneva the ideal headquarters for the League of Nations. Rather than relying on coercive authority, Geneva’s capacity to institutionalise dialogue through arbitral, bureaucratic, and multilateral means made Switzerland an important power in the global diplomatic order. Effectively, Geneva functioned as a space where state representatives, international officials, and transnational actors could interact, supported by the institutional, logistical, and financial resources necessary to sustain prolonged diplomatic engagement.

A similar logic underpins the contemporary diplomatic role of Doha. Lacking significant military power, Qatar has deliberately positioned Doha as a global negotiation hub, boasting political flexibility, infrastructural capacity, and being well-connected to a range of actors. Doha has hosted important conferences including the 2008 Lebanese negotiations and the United States–Taliban talks culminating in the 2020 Afghanistan agreement. Further, it has played a significant role in mediating Gaza ceasefire negotiations. This illustrates how diplomatic convening can substitute for coercive, military leverage. Crucially, Qatar’s diplomatic value lies not only in its neutrality, but in its ability to engage non-state actors alongside Western governments, deploy financial incentives and humanitarian assistance, and sustain prolonged negotiations through the provision of institutional and logistical support.

Vienna and Muscat

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Vienna functioned as a central site of diplomatic coordination, becoming symbolically synonymous with early concert diplomacy. The Congress of Vienna (1814–15) established a system for major powers to mitigate conflict through sustained consultation rather than untempered competition for dominance. Vienna’s importance lay in its capacity to provide a secure and politically acceptable environment for elite negotiation. Diplomatic practice in Vienna relied heavily on informal dialogue, personal relationships, and backchannel communication, with the most consequential bargaining occurring outside formal sessions. This model, notably, involved a closed system of limited great powers.

Muscat reflects a modern manifestation of Vienna’s concert-style diplomacy, albeit in a more informal and functional form. Much like Austria at the time, Oman is characterised by strategic non-alignment, domestic stability, and careful maneuvering of regional power blocs. As in Austria’s case, Oman’s diplomatic value lies in its credibility, discretion, and ability to navigate regional power blocs. However, unlike Austria’s orchestral role in European concert diplomacy, Oman does not participate in the construction of broader diplomatic institutions, rather in a more facilitative capacity. This has enabled Muscat to emerge as a trusted venue for sensitive negotiations. Most notably, Oman hosted secret backchannel talks between the United States and Iran in the early 2010s, which were instrumental in paving the way for the 2015 nuclear agreement. Muscat has also facilitated mediation efforts in Yemen, often operating quietly and away from public scrutiny.  Muscat’s diplomacy highlights how the practices of concert diplomacy have adapted to an increasingly decentralised international system.

Paris and Riyadh

In the twentieth century, Paris functioned as a central node of diplomatic convening, particularly in the realm of treaty settlements. Unlike Geneva or Vienna, Paris’ diplomatic significance was not grounded in neutrality, but rather in its material power and position as a stakeholding European great power. Diplomatic influence in Paris was inseparable from state power, and was backed by substantial economic, political, and military capacity. The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 exemplified this form of diplomacy, where hosting negotiations allowed France to structure debates and shape political settlements in line with its strategic preferences.

Similarly, Saudi Arabia has increasingly positioned itself as a convening power, with significant material resources – including energy wealth, infrastructural capacity, and financial leverage – bolstering its regional political influence. Unlike the aforementioned Middle Eastern states, Saudi Arabia is not a neutral broker, but rather an actor with clearly defined strategic interests. Saudi Arabia’s ability to host pertinent negotiations, such as the Sudan ceasefire talks and the Ukraine peace discussions Jeddah in 2023 reveal an alternative use of diplomacy as an extension of material power rather than a substitute for it. This case study underscores that effective diplomatic hosting thrives on not only on neutrality, but also material strength. This allows Saudi Arabia to cement its role as an order-building actor in regional and international affairs.

International Implications

Taken together, Doha, Muscat, and Riyadh reflect a core understanding on the importance of statecraft: hosting negotiations allows Middle Eastern states to shape agendas, broker dialogue between adversaries, and render themselves essential to international processes. However, their points of leverage differ. Qatar compensates for limited military power through access to non-state actors, the deployment of financial and humanitarian tools, and substantial logistical capacity. Oman’s diplomatic appeal stems from its discretion, credibility, and sustained backchannel access. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, pairs significant material strength with diplomatic convening, using hosting to extend – rather than substitute for – existing power.

These practices underscore diplomacy’s function as a form of soft power, through which states influence outcomes by shaping the conditions where decisions are made, through negotiation rather than coercion. Hosting negotiations builds legitimacy, enabling states to set agendas at relatively low political cost. These cases demonstrate two pathways: soft power as substitution, as seen in Doha and Muscat, and soft power as extension, as exemplified by Riyadh. In both cases, soft power has become increasingly valuable in an international environment where military force is costly. Further, the role of a mediator is particularly attractive, given overt alignment can constrain diplomatic flexibility.

The rise of Middle Eastern diplomatic hubs also indicates a broader international transition towards multipolarity and the growing agency of the Global South. This is accelerating the geographic diffusion of diplomatic authority and power beyond the West. Where twentieth-century diplomatic power was concentrated in Western centres reflecting predominantly Eurocentric priorities, contemporary diplomacy is increasingly decentralised. Consequently, non-Western states are emerging as credible brokers, contributing to an increasingly pragmatic diplomatic order that favours access and inclusivity over rigid geopolitical hierarchy.

Institutionally, this shift accompanies the waning confidence in traditional multilateral forums. Heavy Western involvement in contemporary conflicts has contributed to institutional gridlock, having undermined the ability of Western states to preach neutrality. Persistent paralysis of bodies such as the UN Security Council has underscored the need for complementary international platforms, including the G20, and regionally hosted forums such as the Doha Forum.

This comparative analysis suggests that diplomacy becomes especially vital during periods of systemic transition, be it the interwar years or the contemporary shift towards a multipolar order. In such uncertain times, states seek to carve out positions for themselves within the global power structure through mediation and logistical capacity. This reinforces the argument that diplomacy today is not only political, but profoundly spatial, with true power becoming the ability to shape where – and under which conditions – international conversations take place.

Conclusion

This diplomatic transition is not without risk. Hosting negotiations exposes states to pressure from competing great powers, particularly when talks fail to deliver adequate results. Consequently, claims to neutrality may erode and the credibility of the Middle East as a reliable diplomatic hub can weaken. Navigating these tensions therefore demands a careful balancing act: maintaining sufficient engagement to remain indispensable, while avoiding significant material commitments or overt political alignment with particular blocs.

The European concert system serves as a cautionary tale. Despite its early success in managing the post-Napoleonic order, it ultimately collapsed under escalating great-power rivalry, culminating in the First World War. The question, then, is not whether the Middle East has adopted a modern form of concert-style diplomacy, but rather, how resilient this system will prove to be in a multipolar and decentralised international order. Unlike earlier European concert diplomacy, which was geographically bounded and dominated by a small set of great powers, contemporary diplomatic coordination increasingly transcends regions and blocs. In a world that is smaller, more interconnected and precarious than ever, a critical question emerges: how long can this globalised form of mediation endure? If claims to neutrality and non-alignment erode, there is a risk that Middle Eastern diplomatic hubs may reproduce the same fault lines that undermined their European predecessors. The durability of these new diplomatic hubs will shape not only the future of mediation in the Middle East, but the stability of the multipolar international order itself.