The Antarctic Treaty System: An Outdated System Fuelling Geopolitical Tensions

This briefing explores the current Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), looks at China's growing influence in Antarctica, and examines the continued erosion of the ATS in the current climate. This piece was written by Cheuk Hei Adrian Shum and edited by Joe Card.

All views expressed are the author's and don't necessarily reflect those of the Grimshaw Club.

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If Western powers continue to neglect the continent, the next twenty years look set to deliver a scramble for territory and resources in Antarctica. For the past sixty years, the world’s southernmost continent has been a place where great powers cooperate to maintain a place without war. Yet recently this façade has been falling away as great power competition manifests itself on the continent through increasingly aggressive actions by countries like Russia and China.

Antarctica is unique in its governance. Although seven states, including Britain and Norway, claim territory on the continent, it is not governed by a specific country. Instead, Antarctica is managed under the 1961 Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). This system of governance was negotiated by 12 countries, including the US and the USSR, and set up a military-free zone to prevent it from becoming a flashpoint during the Cold War. The parties agreed that Antarctica was to be a region used for “peaceful purposes only” to guarantee “freedom of scientific investigation,” and this was successfully upheld during the Cold War. 

In 1991, the Protocol on Environmental Protection, an addition to the ATS, imposed a complete ban on mining. The ban was designed to further uphold the protection of the Antarctic environment and eliminate competition for mining, further guaranteeing the peaceful climate there. Yet, amending this protocol will be possible from 2048 if three-quarters of the 12 original ATS countries agree to it.

While this system clearly worked during its early stages, it has long been outdated. Its failure to reflect today’s geopolitical situation has led newly developed countries like China to push back against it, believing that they were unfairly treated and deserve a share of the region. Although China signed the treaty in 1983, Beijing’s grievances are based on their exclusion from the initial ‘Heroic Age’ of Antarctic exploration, where the seven historic claimant states solidified their positions on the continent. Beijing’s grievances are displayed by its lack of compliance with the ATS. It has publicly stated its desire to revoke the 1991 protocol, and like other countries such as Russia and Australia, China militarises its bases covertly by exploiting a loophole which allows “military personnel or equipment for scientific research.” They do this not only by placing more military troops in the area but also by building ground stations for its Beidou satellite navigation system which can help make missiles more accurate.

Russia is another country skirting the rules of the ATS. Unlike China, Russia, as the USSR, was one of the original signatories of the ATS. Yet, the Kremlin has become increasingly unwilling to cooperate with ATS regulations, for example by opposing Norway’s right to inspect Russian runways in 2018. Russia’s actions are founded on a ‘neo-colonialism’ narrative, challenging the seven historic claimant states’ validity in the region. The return of ‘great power’ rivalries demonstrated in the Ukraine War has also raised fears of strategic competition becoming more explicit in Antarctica.

While the shift in geopolitical power towards the east since the Cold War has undoubtedly exacerbated tensions in Antarctica, another potential catalyst arises from global warming. Antarctica’s waters becoming more accessible means that opportunities for mining have started to emerge. Researchers estimate there to be “500 billion tons of oil on the Antarctic continent and 300 to 500 billion tons of natural gas, plus a potential 135 billion tons of oil in the Southern Ocean.” Such economic incentives have further compelled rising powers like China and Russia to act on their grievances with the ATS, developing into the situation observed today. To prevent this situation from further escalating, the ATS needs to be updated to become more compatible with the current geopolitical climate.

China’s influence in Antarctica will only continue to grow.

In 2015, the CCP announced that the “polar regions” are China’s “new strategic frontiers,” while heavily investing in communication, icebreakers, and logistical support capabilities. Left unchecked, China’s presence as a polar great power will continue to grow, allowing them dominance in the region whilst dealing a blow to the ATS.

A deeper dive into China’s ambitions in the South Pole reflects their desire to attain great power status. A CCP policy journal states that “the existing international maritime norms have been set by the West, and in many ways they are disadvantageous to [China’s] maritime strategy...China must defend its national interests.” The CCP believes that the attainment of polar great power status is necessary for their overall image as a great power.

Alongside his desire for prestige, Xi Jinping has explicitly called or the exploitation of Antarctica’s resources. While the 1991 protocol has prevented this from happening, China has already started placing itself in a position of advantage for the possibility of resource extraction. Because the mining ban itself can be removed in 2048, China has been influencing like-minded countries like Russia to fulfil the three-quarters majority by pushing a united, anti-colonial and revisionist Antarctic narrative through its declarations and actions. China’s opening of a new base near the Ross Sea, for example, was notably close to regions of “resource potential.” With its current preparations, China is set to gain massively in Antarctic resources if Western powers continue turning a blind eye to the erosion of the ATS. 

Russia will also gain materially, but will further alienate its position in the ATS

Russia has also made attempts to strengthen its geopolitical position in Antarctica. Its Antarctic Action Plan in 2021 emphasised maritime presence in the region, calling for the defence of their perceived national interests there. Like China, Russia is positioning itself to be one of the favourites to emerge should a scramble for its resources take place. In recent years, Russia has been surveying for hydrocarbons in Antarctic waters while collecting seismic data, both of which are necessary steps before extracting fossil fuels.

While Russia may be able to grow its influence as a great polar power under the status quo, it risks further alienating itself from other ATS signatories. The Kremlin uses the Antarctic as part of its anti-Western propaganda using an anti-colonialism narrative, demonstrated in a Science and Life article titled “Why does Russia need Antarctica?” while often being suspicious of the actions of the historic claimant states. Russia has historically been assertive in Antarctica, for example by vetoing every proposal at an international conference tasked with preserving Antarctic marine life last year much to the dismay of the other signatories.

This divide has also been exacerbated by the Ukraine War. The return of great power rivalry has already begun to manifest in Antarctica, with the marginalisation of Russia in the international community contributing to its entrenched sense of victimhood, which in turn aligns with its “anti-colonialism” narrative in the Antarctic. This was evident in the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting in 2022, which saw many parties showing overt disdain for Russian officials. If Russia continues its policy of disdain for international cooperation in Antarctica, its divide with other signatories might become irreconcilable.

The continued erosion of the ATS will continue if its signatories do not revise it

The U.S., the main geopolitical power among the other signatories of the ATS, has not reinforced its commitment to the region, instead “announcing that it will reduce its short-term activities and long-term capabilities in the region”. This policy is ineffective in today’s geopolitical climate. Although the U.S. seem to be aware of the geopolitical shifts in the region, shown by the imposition of sanctions on Russia’s Antarctic flagship for its gas and oil exploration activities, it has not properly deterred countries like China and Russia from skirting the rules. Similarly, the EU, which has 20 countries involved in the ATS, does not have an agreed policy on Antarctica, and has not taken any action to safeguard the ATS. It’s not that the rest of the West are indifferent about the Antarctic, though—claimant states such as Norway and the UK have recently invested in infrastructure and upgraded facilities in the region.

If the ATS signatories continue to take a backseat, China, Russia and other developing countries will become increasingly emboldened to bypass regulations set by the treaties, making the erosion of the ATS almost inevitable. Military presence will continue to grow under the guise of scientific research, while further steps will be taken towards ensuring optimal mineral extraction after a potential rule change in 2048. Furthermore, any violation of the 1991 protocol could undermine the ATS, as the legitimacy of the seven original claimants of Antarctica would be questioned without the ATS, potentially dismantling the entire system.

To prevent the deterioration of peace in the Antarctic, the ATS needs to be revised. Its original signatories must recognise that the original claimants’ territories need to be further divided to include China, reflecting today’s geopolitical situation. Both Russia and China have also complained of a club of Western countries that is quick to identify the two countries as obstacles to Antarctic unity. This is another aspect which should also be shifted by Western countries reducing the constant condemnation of Russia and China, accepting that it is impossible to maintain a complete lack of militarisation and strategic interest in the region.

Most importantly, the signatories must acknowledge the inevitability of resource extraction in the Antarctic and take proactive steps in preparation. Whether extraction happens before 2048 or not, the ATS can prepare for this outcome by convening all signatories to diplomatically allocate mining regions—similar to the Berlin Conference of 1884—to prevent a chaotic "free-for-all" that could even escalate to military involvement. After all, the ATS was constructed to ensure peace in the region—something which can still happen with these changes. In the short-term, the encouragement of more joint scientific research projects with China would help maintain the “collaborative science” aspect of the ATS.

With the sheer amount of conflict going on in the world, the deteriorating situation in Antarctica is probably at the back of the minds of world leaders. As such, important though revision of the ATS is, it is unlikely to occur while the signatories allow the current situation to continue. This is why more eyes—especially Western governments—need to be on the Antarctic in the coming years to observe how far countries like China and Russia are willing to go to break the ATS. More exposure to the alarming nature of these countries’ actions to the ATS would heighten the importance of a revision to the ATS to update territorial claims and revise outdated goals which are incompatible with the current geopolitical climate. Hopefully, this revision will lower the chance of conflict in the region.