This briefing looks at the role of Türkiye in establishing a New Syria following the collapse of the Assad regime. It examines the current context, and opportunities and dangers facing Turkish foreign policy. This piece was written by Diego Toderi and edited by Ruyi Liu.
December 2024 saw the lightning collapse of a regime many believed had managed to weather the storm of rebellion. Rotted out by years of mismanagements and corruption, the Assad regime that had ruled Syria for over 50 years was overthrown in just 11 days by a combined rebel offensive led primarily by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Sunni Islamist militant group. Out of the ashes of this old regional order, Türkiye has emerged as a leading regional power, holding both the ability and the will to exploit the power vacuum in the region for its gain. The new reality allows Türkiye to consolidate its rise as a regional power as well as resolve its long-lasting conflict with Kurdish militias in northeast Syria. However, Türkiye needs to tread carefully. Whilst it may have emerged as a leading power, many other actors such as Israel have key stakes in Syria's future. Furthermore, a secure and stable future for Syria is far from certain, and Türkiye's deep involvement risk turning triumphalism into defeat.
Context
The last decade has seen a seismic shift in Turkish foreign policy. Catalysed by internal political processes, Turkish foreign policy has taken on a much more unilateral, independent, and assertive tint. Following the failed 2016 coup, Erdogan, the Turkish president, has managed to consolidate his power through the abolishment of the country's parliamentary system and the office of PM. This has allowed Erdogan to put Türkiye on a path marked not only by interventions in multiple conflicts in its periphery but also a pronounced divergence from the interests and policies of its Western allies. Türkiye has sought a hedging strategy between Russia and the US, seeking deeper ties with the former while maintaining amicable relations with the US. Backed by a vision of a more inclusive world order, Erdogan seeks to elevate Türkiye's status in an increasingly multipolar world as seen through the much-used motto of "the world is bigger than 5".
Nowhere has this new trend been tested and shaped more than in Syria. In many ways, the country and its civil war are the cornerstone for Türkiye's new foreign policy, representing a testing ground for an increasingly interventionist and assertive outlook. Policy towards Syria has evolved from actively supporting the fall of the regime in the early days of the civil war to seeking to reconcile with Assad in more recent years. Syria has also seen Türkiye rely more heavily on its rapidly modernising military. Turkish military intervention in Syria has been primarily shaped by its historic conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party or the PKK, a militant group representing the country's Kurdish ethnic minority, which has fought an insurgency against the Turkish state on and off since 1984. The chaos of the initial civil war and the fight against the Islamic State allowed the People’s Defense Units or YPG, a primarily Kurdish-led militia linked to the PKK, to expand and consolidate its position in North-eastern Syria, forming the Autonomous Administration of North Eastern Syria (AANES) and the Syrian Defence Forces (SDF), a Kurdish led coalition of ethnic militia. Türkiye views the rise of the AANES on its border as a fundamental security threat and border security has thus remained one of Türkiye's primary goals in Syria. Since 2016, Türkiye has launched multiple direct military interventions to create buffer zones, alongside nurturing and supporting armed groups opposed to Kurdish autonomy such as the diverse groups found under the Syrian National Army (SNA).
The Syrian civil war has also seen Türkiye emerge as an indispensable partner and negotiator that both Moscow and Washington partnered with to achieve their own goals. Türkiye was involved extensively in negotiating the Astana agreements as well as in the creation of a de-militarised zone in Idlib. Türkiye also showed its willingness to defend such settlements and the status quo from infringement. For example, it responded with military force in 2020 to limit a regime offensive that was encroaching on the “de-escalation zone” in Idlib.
Opportunities
The sudden fall of Assad presents Türkiye with an opportunity to both achieve its goals in Syria as well as secure its growth as a regional power. Whilst the fall of Assad may have been an achievement long abandoned by Ankara after the initial rebellion was crushed by Russian airpower and Iranian militias, Türkiye still can take advantage of the new reality for its gain.
The overthrow of the regime has seen rival powers lose considerable influence. Iran has suffered another serious blow to its "Axis of Resistance", a loose set of Iranian-backed proxies and allies. Iran's proxies were instrumental in propping up the regime and Syria provided a key logistical corridor to Hezbollah. Now with this corridor most likely cut and Hezbollah itself severely degraded by Israeli airstrikes, Iranian influence in the region is at an all-time low. Another loser is Russia whose prestige and claim as a reliable security guarantor has been undermined. Preoccupied with its war in Ukraine, Russia's ability to project power and influence has declined steadily, and now with its military presence in Syria at threat, Russia's role as an important factor in Syria has further diminished. Whilst not necessarily losing out due to the fall of Assad, the election of Trump has put the US's involvement in Syria in question. As of now, the US has partnered extensively with the SDF to combat the Islamic State but Trump has recently signalled his intent to withdraw its forces from Syria.
Türkiye has thus been handed an increasingly free hand over Syria, unlike in earlier years when its policy had to navigate fierce strategic competition. It can and has taken a leading role in the reconstruction of Syria, viewing a strong unified Syria essential to achieving its foreign policy goals. Economically rebuilding the country presents a lucrative opportunity that Türkiye is best suited to seize, evidenced by the surge in stock prices of Turkish construction firms following Assad's fall. Türkiye has also shown its willingness to help the new transitional government rebuild its military forces, with its defence secretary highlighting readiness to provide military training upon request and foster deeper military cooperation. Türkiye has extensive experience in this area, having supported countries such as Libya and Somalia in reconstructing and modernising multiple militaries.
Türkiye thus has the ability to capture a leading role in a new Syria. Apart from solidifying itself as a major regional power able to reliably project its influence in its near periphery, a stable Syria offers Türkiye the best shot at resolving its security concerns regarding the Kurds. A strong centralised Syrian government increases the chance of a reintegration of Kurdish armed groups into a wider Syria without direct Turkish military involvement. The utilisation of force in the past has been diplomatically costly for Türkiye. The 2019 Operation Peace Spring drew strong condemnation, with the EU condemning "Türkiye's unilateral action" and the US leveraging sanctions against various Turkish ministries. The SDF's position in North-Eastern Syria has been significantly undermined following the fall of Assad with its control of most of Syria's oil supplies drawing increasing attention from the new interim government in Damascus. Combined with multiple offensives by the SNA against the SDF, there is a possibility that the autonomous zones may be reintegrated within a centrally controlled Syrian government, thus helping Türkiye to achieve its wider foreign policy goals for a lesser cost.
Dangers
However, greater Turkish involvement in the future of Syria does not come without serious risks. Stabilising Syria and constructing a stable Turkish-backed state is highly challenging, potentially leading to Türkiye being burdened with a failing state right on its border. Firstly, constructing a new Syrian military from a diverse grouping of militias each representing different ethnic and societal interests is a monumental task. Many ethnic minorities are fearful of the idea of potentially giving up their ability to defend themselves to a central government they find untrustworthy. Extensive atrocities against the Kurds, for example by the SNA and Türkiye, have incentivised the AANES and SDF to call for a decentralised structure, something that the interim government in Damascus has rejected. Thus, there is a severe risk that Syria will descend into factional infighting and perpetual instability, a disaster for Turkish foreign policy.
Moreover, whilst Türkiye may hold great influence in Syria, it is far from the only power involved. Israel, following the collapse of Assad's regime, has occupied the buffer zone with Syria in clear breach of the 1974 agreement. It has also launched an extensive strike campaign against the remnants of the regime's conventional arsenal, with Israeli airstrikes attacking airbases and ports. Israel-Türkiye relations have deteriorated steadily in the aftermath of October 7th, with Türkiye continuously accusing Israel of utilising the attack as an excuse for “occupation” and expansion. Israel has thus begun to regard a Türkiye-backed Syrian regime under the HTS as a grave security threat, with the Nagel Committee of the Israeli government warning that Israel must prepare for a potential war with Türkiye. Israel may thus seek to curb Turkish influence by supporting individual ethnic militias, such as calling for the protection of the Kurds. If the rivalry between Türkiye and Israel intensifies, Syria would likely become a key battleground, severely undermining the chance for any stability in the country. Combined with Arab states' suspicion about Türkiye's potentially neo-ottoman ambitions in Syria, Türkiye may grapple with a deteriorating security situation whilst relatively isolated from potential partners and help.
The descent of Syria into chaos would represent a disaster for Turkish foreign policy. It would necessitate another direct round of military intervention, which Erdogan has not ruled out, thus exposing Türkiye to future consequences and isolation. Through guilt by association, it would also undermine Türkiye's image as a competent negotiator and actor in the region. What seemed like a victory may soon turn into a quagmire that will haunt Türkiye for years to come.
Conclusion
The new reality provides Türkiye with both opportunities but also serious risks. Though the fall of Assad could see the rise of Turkish influence and power, it could also lead to serious problems. The fundamental issue is that barely one month after the collapse of the regime, too much is uncertain, not clear, or simply unknown. Türkiye should thus avoid taking on long-term unilateral commitments in a new unstable Syria. Türkiye should instead seek to collaborate with and help organise the response of external partners in the region, particularly the Arab and Gulf states who all have interests in a stable Syria. Not only would this expand the influence and power of Turkish diplomacy, it would also avoid the risk of unilateral action and potential isolation. No matter what happens in the future, it remains a fact that Türkiye is one of, if not the, biggest beneficiary of Assad's fall.
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